Where is the World Environment Organization?

Authored by Lucien Georgeson, a PhD student in the Department of Geography, UCL. Originally published at ClimateSnack.

While reading reports from various international organisations in the early stages of my research, I found it hard to believe how the environment is not given the same status as other global issues. It is an anomaly of the United Nations that there is no dedicated environmental organisation amongst the 15 autonomous, specialised agencies. This secondary status and the lack of coherenceover responsibilities harms environmental governance at the global scale. Would having a World Environment Organization help coordinate global environmental and climate change efforts?

A World Environment Organization would collaborate global efforts towards mitigation of and adaptation to all environmental challenges, of which climate change may be the largest. As summarised by the AAAS’s excellent What We Know report, ‘we are at risk of pushing our climate system toward abrupt, unpredictable, and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts’[1]. Continue reading

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Interdisciplinarity at the London Business School – conference preview

Ed Jones is a PhD Student at the Bartlett School of Planning.

Later this month research students from all over London will come together for an interdisciplinary conference at London Business School. The conference will bring together ESRC-funded PhD students from a wide range of disciplines for two days of presentations, lectures and discussion. The conference will prompt reflection on our own research and disciplinary boundaries, and the issues raised by cross disciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches to a range of topics.

The ESRC stresses the importance of interdisciplinary research, supporting ‘new and exciting research which combines approaches from more than one discipline’ and recognising that ‘many of the most pressing challenges are interdisciplinary in nature.’ Interdisciplinarity is a hot topic in academia, and funding bodies are increasingly keen to ensure that research activities adopt interdisciplinary perspectives. There is a fertile debate around the issues raised by interdisciplinary research; some stressing the benefits of seeing problems using perspectives from outside your field, while others see interdisciplinary encounters as reinforcing disciplinary boundaries if substantial engagement between different disciplines can’t be reached.

The conference has been organised by students from across London’s DTCs, who faced tough choices in deciding which of the excellent abstracts to choose for the talks and poster sessions. The sessions have been organised around the ESRC’s key themes of environment and energy, health and wellbeing, social diversity, technology and innovation, global economy, security and conflict, and understanding behaviour. There will also be a special session addressing recent events in Egypt. The sessions will cover a diverse range of topics, including why developing countries sign tax treaties, the ethics of Israeli militarism and Georgian hospitality. The second day includes an interdisciplinary exercise which promises to be an interesting and imaginative way of seeing real world issues from the standpoint of other disciplines.

With keynote talks from the University of Oxford’s pioneering childhood studies researcher Prof Jo Boyden and Prof Roger Burrows, the pro-warden for interdisciplinary development at Goldsmiths, the conference will be a great opportunity to meet with students from other social science disciplines, share knowledge and develop understandings.

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Me, Myself, and Introspection: Autobiography in Academia

Authored by Oliver Marsh, a PhD Researcher in Science Enthusiasm and Social Media at the UCL Science and Technology Studies Department.  Originally appeared at the blog SidewaysLookAtScience.

 

The other week, while writing a paper for a Digital Sociology workshop, I inserted the following nauseatingly self-absorbed passage:

For completeness, I should probably also tell you a couple of salient points about my own background.  I originally entered university doing a physics degree, intending to go into science communication, but finished up doing history of science, particularly social history of science communication, and then moved into sociology of science a few months ago.  I should also note that I was never a serious member of any online science enthusiast communities, including the ones I’m studying.

Even as I was writing it, I wasn’t quite sure why it was there.  Maybe a subconscious longing for a fancy personal intro in a conference, like proper academics.  Maybe the influence of a paper I read recently about Antonio Gramsci who – in addition to doing time in prison (making him one of the few social scientists with an excuse for not doing data collection) and wanting to scatter socialist literature from hot air balloons – examined the personal backgrounds of scholars.  But the most honest answer is that it sent a signal: although I was discussing sociological methods, I actually have zero experience of sociological methods and if they asked me hard questions I would cry.  Surprisingly the response was not ‘this is an academic meeting, take your X Factor backstory and get out’.  Instead, they felt this was a useful addition to my talk.  Which I regard as a victory for my cowardice.  But was it a victory for academia?

Generally I regard cowardice as inimical to academia – scholarship should be about putting your ideas out in a bold and clear way that maximises the ease of being properly critiqued.  Sometimes personal features assist cowardice and laziness – for instance, an idea might be accepted or rejected without due critical thought because of who wrote it.1  But in other cases personal features assist good scholarship, as with (for example) feminist scholars who have shown able to show some very subtle biases in academia due to a lack of female perspectives.2  So one question is: when do personal features make for better scholarship?

There’s a rather bigger question lurking behind that: what do we want scholarship to do?  What distinguishes ‘scholarship’ from other stuff that involves thinking, hypothesising, debating, and generally trying to be clever?  Personally, I think of academia as a project to understand all the world.  Why is that apple falling to the ground? How did we come to have our systems of government, our forms of entertainment, our belief systems, etc.?  Is there a Lord Gaga?  This implies a certain degree of detachment – the emphasis is on the world, not our writing about it.  We don’t create our own new worlds, unlike creative writers; we try to take our evidence from the world and not just ask other people, unlike journalists; we use methodologies, unlike generally clever people writing generally clever things.  The utopian aim of scholarship, then, might be some abstracted and impartial understanding of the whole world, the ability to answer any question without just making stuff up.

Well, maybe.  To fully discuss that here would require me to use postmodernism, pluralism, and far more space and coffee than I have available.3  The point I’d like to make is that ensuring best-fit with the world is hindered, not helped, by trying too hard to be abstract and impersonal.  The personality and skills of an individual inevitably enter into academia, what with it being a practice carried out by humans.  There are mechanisms for distancing these influences, like anonymous reviewing or declaration of funding interests.  But to say these are completely successful would be to miss interesting, and probably important, points.  Take experiments. A common argument runs that experiments should give the same result irrespective of who is carrying them out.  The principle is pretty clear, but I can assure you that the results of experiments can vary wildly depending on whether or not they’re being carried out by me.  Less glibly, this also neglects the fact that doing one experiment over and over isn’t the entirety of ‘science’.  Even the best experiments have to move out of the lab sometime, and this involves some pretty human processes like judging when the experiment should end, whether the experiment is good enough to convince (especially if it overturns prior beliefs), whether the news is worth passing on further (and if so, how), or even if it’s worth doing in the first place.

As a sociologist I’m contractually obliged to point out that contexts, as well as personalities, enter into all this.  I certainly know that I’m a much harsher critic of papers when I read them for reading groups than when I read them to teach undergraduates.  In the former case I’m trying to maximise the number of interesting (read: argumentative and nitpicky) points I can throw into the discussion.  In the latter I’m trying to show the students some useful points they can take out of that reading which they definitely actually did, honest.  Now obviously there’s more to it than that – I really hope my overall assessments are somewhat influenced by how good the arguments are – but I’d be lying if I claimed I could easily recognise and defeat all my biases.  And I’d also be lying if I claimed such biases weren’t also present when I produce new research.  So that’s where autobiographical passages like the one I opened with come in handy.  By showing one’s personal background and the contexts one is working within, a scholar can give that bit more info to help audiences locate possible biases, blindspots, and bonus experience instead.4  It’s really just an extension of making your methodology clear.

The problem with that is… well, there are lots of problems.  Firstly, how much information to give?  Given all that contextual stuff, should every footnote include a potted ‘I read this paper while…’ backstory?  Should all work begin with your 3-volume autobiography, just to make sure that you haven’t missed a relevant self-detail?  Secondly, even if your audience can minimise your biases they also bring their own.  Thirdly, and most worryingly, this could push academia towards a clamour of voices, each with their own valuable viewpoint, and away from anything that can be synthesised sensibly.  This can be seen in a bizarre and fascinating chapter entitled ‘Perfectly Normal Female Interest In Men Bonking’ – if you look for it on the internet I’d advise using an academic search engine – coauthored by sociologist of fandom Henry Jenkins and two fans from the communities he studies.  They begin with the interesting argument that academics, in providing their own reflections on fans, downplay the importance of fans’ own self-reflections.  Their solution to this is simply to hurl out pages and pages of fans’ self-reflections on slash fiction.  The authors’ point, I think, is that all these competing voices have equal validity which should not be distorted by some academic synthesis– a fact the authors acknowledge by not providing a conclusion.  The disjointed content is interesting, but it doesn’t connect up to give a firmer grasp on any world .  If there’s any methodology going on, besides selective copy-and-pasting, it isn’t clear.

But despite all that, I’m still in favour of providing some autobiographical reflections in academic work.  It’s good for full clarity, to open yourself up to the possibility you’ve fooled yourself.  It opens up all work to the charge of human fallibility, rather than only when we want to highlight human-ness for our own purposes (it’s interesting it’s interesting that history of science lectures, in my experience, provide photos, biographical snippets, and other humanising sights of scientists, but only textual extracts from other historians).  It’s also a possibly good way to highlight prevailing influences in groups of academics, whether in a particular institution or country or all of academia.  Many of these are pretty well known anyway – white middle-class dominance ahoy – but there’s no harm in making that even more painfully obvious.  Basically, whatever we want academia to do, we want it to be ‘right’ or ‘correct’ in some way5 – and rightness and correctness are only a few steps away from honesty.

But these are all very fresh and slightly confused thoughts.  In particular, I’d like to say something more specific than ‘let’s have some autobiographical reflections everyone’, something which takes on board the problems I raised rather than stuffing them in a cupboard to deal with later.  So if you have any ideas or suggestions I’d be very interested to hear them.  So send them to me.  Along with your 3-volume autobiography.

1 = One argument runs that big-name academics can hide dodgy ideas behind their eminence, while PhD students’ ideas are held back by a presumption of their inexperience.  I think this is a somewhat blinkered argument, as the work of big-name academics gets plenty of hype and attention, and in academic terms this often translates as greater criticism – after all, I’d hope we go through enough training to recognise dodgy ideas no matter whose name is at the top of them.  The bigger problem, I’d argue, is not hero worship but the disproportionate attention, both positive and negative, paid to certain academics.  After all, if a PhD student writes a groundbreaking paper in a forest and no-one is around to hear it…

2 = A specific example from my own field is Elisabeth Lloyd’s work on the various adaptive explanations proposed by biologists for existence of the female orgasm.

3 = Very simplistically, the view propounded by many postmodernist and postmodernism-influenced scholars is that the statement ‘that’s just the way it is’ is never a good one – we cannot access a single privileged description of the real-world-out-there, as metaphysics tries to do, but instead lots of (often incoherent) viewpoints.  Ideas of ‘truth’ and ‘progress’ and ‘humanity’ are seen as created by humans, while the real-world-out-there remains permanently inaccessible.  Pluralism, again very simplistically, says that there are many possible viewpoints on anything, and there’s no problem with these existing side-by-side.  Although there’s obvious links with postmodernism, I get the sense that many pluralists are ok with saying we have some access to reality.  But this is all philosophy, which is most definitely Not My Thing.  If you want to know more from some actually reliable informants,, the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is often pretty good.

4 = My excellent friend and colleague Raquel Velho gave me a good example of journal articles in disability studies.  This is a field in which personal experience is often very important, but also the power of disclosing said experience is down to the author (unlike gender, nationality, or affiliation which can be gleaned from author details).

5 = Despite all that postmodern and pluralism stuff – on which subject my thoughts are very conflicted and confused – but the point I’d make is that aiming for some form of truth-to-the-world is better than scholars throwing in the towel and going ‘heck I’ll just sit in an armchair and say whatever like cos it’s all kind of true and kind of false anyway’

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What can Harvard Business School tell us about gender in schools and business?

Authored by Scarlett Brown, a PhD Researcher studying Gender in Board Appointments at Kings College London, Department of Management.  Originally appeared at the blog Sociology Lens.

In a recent Sociology Lens post, my colleague Markus Gerke discussed the so called ‘Boys-Crisis’ in Education, and provides an excellent critique of anti-feminist stances that point to boys apparent underachievement in education. As he argues, these stances so often fail to account for gendered practices that occur in schooling and education, and by utilising feminist education studies and masculinity studies, the differences between boys and girls achievement can be explained much more accurately. Rather than inherent ‘qualities’ existing to either sex, in an essentialist view about what makes ‘boys’ and ‘girls’ the way that they are, certain classroom behaviours are viewed as more acceptable for boys or girls, in line with social and cultural understandings of masculinity and femininity. These expectations can be used to understand a great many behaviours – why girls are more inclined to read or sit quietly, or why boys may resort more easily to playing up in classrooms, all have in them inherent implications about what is gender-appropriate behaviour. In terms of understanding why girls and boys succeed in different areas, we simply have to ask whether the behaviour is ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’.  Writers such as Bev Skeggs and Mike Savage have written extensively about how these categories also intersect with class: acceptable masculinities and femininities vary drastically according to class and background.

In reading Markus’ article I was struck by the similarities to the subject I intended on discussing in this post – the evidence of gender inequalities at Harvard Business School and how they are being addressed. Harvard Business School were the subject of a front-page article in the New York Times last month, when an article by Jodi Kantor revealed that the school, one of the most prestigious academic institutions in the world, had restructured their curriculum, assessment criteria and even social rules and regulations in order to attempt to address a gender imbalance and encourage female success.  Before the changes were implemented they were finding persistent inequalities: Women were performing at equal levels to men in written papers but falling far short did on participation based criteria. Much like in the classroom, the acceptability of masculine or dominant behaviour compared to feminine behaviour creates a culture that more easily supports ‘masculine’ ways of being. Recent sociological work into gender and networking practices calls this “mobilising masculinities”, referring to the practices that occur between men that bring masculinity/ies into play, often unwillingly, and have either an exclusionary or devaluing effect on women and femininity. It appears then that this gendering of acceptable practices does not disappear as we look further up the educational ladder.

The problem that both of these articles raise is how this culture can be tackled. Both require a pedagogical change to ensure that the way individuals are taught and assessed does not unwittingly benefit one gender, or reproduce a culture that is biased. This also has implications for other changes in how things are taught, for instance there is now much debate around how technology should be used in the classroom to engage young people more effectively, such as through the use of computer games or twitter. These changes have the potential to level the playing field or drastically skew it, depending largely on how the technology is used and, most importantly, how aware the education providers are of the potential biases these tools can create. In the case of Harvard Business School, the changes they made to the assessment critera seemed to drastically improve women’s success. However what is crucial to note is that their ‘experiment’ involved examining the entire culture, not just the specifics of assessment. By seeking to tackle a gendered culture across the social life of the school, they were able to, at least partly, regain some gender balance in the outcomes.

Gender differences are more complex than a simple comparison between men and women, and it is only by looking at the broader culture surrounding practices that any move towards solving them can be made. In discussing the Harvard case it was also noted that by becoming more sensitive to gender, the culture within the school bore less resemblance to the ‘real’ business world. The professors ask; “Are we trying to change the world 900 students at a time, or are we preparing students for the world in which they are about to go?” It can only be hoped that the former will continue, and that other institutions will follow suit.

Further Reading 

Martin, P. Y. (2001). Mobilizing Masculinities’: Women’s Experiences of Men at. Organization8(4), 587-618.

Savage, Mike; Silva, Elizabeth and Warde, Alan (2010) Dis-identification and class identity. In: Not Set ed. Cultural analysis and Bourdieu’s legacy: settling accounts and developing alternatives. Culture, Economy and the Social. London: Routledge, pp. 60–74.

Skeggs, B. (2004). Class, self, culture. Routledge.

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In Praise of Shortenificization: A Review and a Rant.

Authored by Oliver Marsh, a PhD Researcher in Science Enthusiasm and Social Media at the UCL Science and Technology Studies Department.  Originally appeared at the blog SidewaysLookAtScience.

Richard P. Feynman had a habit of being right about science.  Mostly physical science, but occasionally biological science, or computer science.   And even, it transpires, social science:

There was a sociologist who had written a paper for us all to read – something he had written ahead of time. I started to read the damn thing, and my eyes were coming out: I couldn’t make head nor tail of it! I figured it was because I hadn’t read any of the books on that list. I have this uneasy feeling of “I’m not adequate,” until finally I said to myself, “I’m gonna stop, and read one sentence slowly, so I can figure out what the hell it means.”

So I stopped – at random – and read the next sentence very carefully. I can’t remember it precisely, but it was very close to this: “The individual member of the social community often receives his information via visual, symbolic channels.” I went back and forth over it, and translated. You know what it means? “People read”.

 

This has been a guide for me ever since I made the leap from physics to social sciences, in conjunction with his more famous first rule of science, “you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool”.  Together they provide two essential Thou Shalt Nots for the social scientist.  But sometimes – indeed, a worrying proportion of the time – I wish more social scientists had read this short passage.  But now it’s become a mere appetiser for a somewhat less pithy, but equally essential, reading – a wonderful book with the excellently severe title Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences by Michael Billig.

 

Billig’s book has other points to recommend besides an awesome title.  In fact, it’s a great lesson in multitasking.  Firstly, it provides an extensive study of the way social scientists, as a group, write.  Billig notes an overwhelming tendency to turn verbs into long noun phrases (usually ending in –ism or –ization) and acronyms. So instead of saying ‘social scientists are using noun phrases’, many would instead write ‘nominalization has occurred’.  The problems with this are fairly obvious.  Problem one is that it looks ‘academic’ and ‘authoritative’ – or, as those of us keen on public engagement with academia would say, ‘offputting’ and ‘needlessly opaque’ and ‘stop it’.  But beyond public engagement (which Billig expressly states isn’t His Thing) this needless opaqueness is still a problem, even for people who are professionally good at dealing with long words. 

This is apparent in the second and third problems. The second problem is that replacing verbs with nouns has the effect of replacing descriptions of actual-people-doing-actual-things with theoretical concepts.1  The cumulative effect of this is to produce, in Billig’s wonderful words, “concept jigsaws” rather than well-evidenced accounts of people living in social worlds.  Thirdly, if you trace these highfalutin noun phrases back through a lifetime of citations, you find they have a habit of mutating in meaning.  Somewhat unsurprisingly this causes a wee bit of confusion, as different authors unwittingly use one specific word to mean a great variety of things.  And no, it turns out that the old trope of ‘defining your terms’ doesn’t stop this – people just end up slowly but surely wandering away from them, whistling nonchalantly as they leave your wonderfully precise description discarded behind them.

Now, some might respond by claiming that these noun-phrases and acronyms are essential tools for efficiently conveying information.   The point of these long words is to encode a sentence (or more) worth of information, which is why we write ‘Longwordism is [insert sentence here]’.  And if you acronymise a collection of long words, you can have lots of these sentences in a few letters. BONUS.  But hold fire for a second there.   Even if these long words are conveying information efficiently, amidst all the theoretical jigsaws and mutating meanings they aren’t necessarily conveying it accurately, usefully, or even intelligibly.   And even the prosaic ‘oh well at least they’re reducing my word count’ doesn’t hold up either.  As Billig notes, if academics were really trying to save space they’d produce acronyms for commonly used phrases like MRIN (‘More Research Is Needed’) or IMCTWT (‘It’s More Complicated Than We Thought’) or SRMWSFLP (‘Someone Remind Me What Sunlight Feels Like Please’). 

So why why why do social scientists do all this stuff?  Billig to the rescue again.  The third, and arguably most interesting, purpose of the book is as a sociology of social scientists.  He argues that these writing tropes are symptomatic of other stuff going on in the lives of social scientists today.  In particular, it’s down to the hefty competition, CV-building, and self-marketing required in modern academic life.  Distinctive noun-phrases and acronyms give you a personal product to market, and a banner for your followers to explicitly align themselves to.  There’s also an educational element to it.  Undergraduate students can’t just show they’re generally clever, they have to show they were actually listening to the lectures by using the same clever terms.  Postgraduate students who are moving into research have to find an ‘approach’ or ‘school’ to align themselves with – by, you guessed it, using the correct terms.  And let’s not even think about peer review (that’s a phrase I wish I could say far more frequently).  As sociologists like to say, there are ‘structural factors’ at work, not just disconnected examples of bad writing.  Which is why Billig downplays the writing-manual side of his book.  Cos it ain’t all as simple as everyone learning to write a bit better.

So that, in a rather rapid and reduced nutshell, is Billig’s book.  Actually there’s a fourth aspect, but that comes more from my reading than Billig’s writing.  It’s also a great lesson in practising what you preach.  Because I do have one issue with the book: by suggesting social scientists should use verby language to focus very heavily on actual-people-doing-actual-things, I worry he cuts too deep and makes social science into very detailed description of very particular situations with little cross-comparing, broader theorization, or the like.  But then again Billig manages to simultaneously follow his own writing advice – and the book is a superbly good read as a result – but also produce a compelling and broad picture of modern academic life.  I’m still not quite sure how he does it.  But I’m well jealous.  Though still a little unsure.

Anyway.  To end, I’d like to extend Billig’s argument into slightly different territories.  And, following my own ‘structural factor’ of having just got back from the pub, this is going to take the form of slight rant.2   I agree that clarity of writing does matter, and I get fed up with canonical authors who ‘you just have to re-read a couple of times’ (yes pre-1980s Michel Foucault I am looking at you).  But terminology is not just a matter of making sure people get your ideas.  As Feynman said, it’s also a matter of sticking your neck out and holding the possibility that you’ve ‘fooled yourself’ up for examination.  And in the social sciences we do sometimes fool ourselves.  Playing with concept jigsaws is worryingly fun, and when all the pieces fit neatly together the thrill of clever phrasing is easy to mistake for the thrill of discovery.  And social science shouldn’t just be about the enjoyment of showing off.  That’s one reason blogging and other public engagement stuff is extremely useful – it forces you to strip away terminology and, sometimes, realize you’re actually just stating the bleedin’ obvious.  As Feynman noted, ‘people read’ is not actually a scientific discovery

 

But the effect of terminology goes beyond lack of comprehension.  Terminology conveys an impression.  For those already disengaged from the social sciences, bad and unexplained terminology just confirms that we’re nothing but pretentious ivory-tower wordsmiths.  And for those engaged with the social sciences, it suggests that long and authoritative words are a Good Thing.  I’m particularly thinking of ‘the left-wing’3, a faction that sociology has a long history of (often very productive) links with.  Emotionally and spiritually and other abstract-things-ily I am very much in that camp.  But I find it sadly hard to intellectually associate myself with a rhetoric that frequently bandies around terms like ‘marketisation’.  Yeah sure, we know what markets are and we can get vague idea what that means.  But who is doing what to who and where and what can we do to stop it?  And I don’t think trying to define the term ‘marketisation’ will work either.Neither will creating completely new radical terms that get away from everyday meaning (yet another topic discussed by Billig, the utter machine that he is), as that would just create a very strong in-the-know / not-in-the-know language barrier.  But most importantly, think of the impression it conveys.  Recall Billig’s argument that noun phrases make it look like theoretical concepts, rather than people, do things; it’s kinda similar to the idea that overarching forces of evil and capitalism (perhaps embodied in a shadowy worldwide cabal) do the bad things in the world.5  It’s the sort of rhetoric that, accidentally or not, sounds a bit crazy-conspiracy-theory; the sort of rhetoric that, in a previous life, put me right off left-wing politics until I fortunately ended up working with a group of friendly socialists who convinced me otherwise.  It was a lucky and very effective lesson. I can’t remember exactly how they did it, but I bet they used some verbs.

 

Basically, what is needed is the diffusion of Billigization across a spatially-extreme but temporally-contracted landscape in a multi- inter- intra- and trans-disciplinary actualization, with concomitant socio-political decontextualisation and recontextualisation.  Is that really too much to ask?

 

1 = This is a crucial difference with the natural sciences, where describing experimental objects – particles, bacteria, whatever –in the language of people-doing-things can produce confusion.  For instance the sentence ‘the electron goes towards the positive cathode because that makes it happy’ hides more information than it reveals, no matter how cute an image it is.

2 = For anyone who’s not had the pleasure (read ‘amusement’) of seeing me rant, it’s very stereotypically English.  One high-pitched shout, followed by a lot of apologising and retracting and Hugh Grant noises.   Also, for anyone who notes that I posted this mid-morning, there was some proof-reading in between the pub and the posting.  Honest.

3 = The phrase ‘the left wing’ is a great example of how short words definitely always describe something clear and obvious and concrete. <SARCASM CLAXON>.  In seriousness though, I am aware I’m speaking from my experiences of a very limited branch of left-wing-ness and – unsurprisingly – it is a particularly academic branch. 

4 = Firstly because of Billig’s whole ‘terms-mutate-meaning-and-there-ain’t-nothing-you-can-do-about it, secondly because sitting down and coming to concrete agreement isn’t the strong point of either sociologists or the left wing, and thirdly because it’d probably look something like this:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oW9_GqShJPg.  Although, as my lovely friend Sara Peres (off of UCL STS) pointed out, ‘marketisation’ might serve as a useful way of bringing previously hidden links between things to light.  That is a fair and complicated and subtle point, and as such has no place in my rant.

5 = Some might argue this is a useful view, perhaps as a metaphor, or perhaps because you take the popular sociological view that everyday acts combine to form overarching social forces.  My response is – well, maybe.  As a sociologist that’s interesting.  Outside of sociology it just sounds kinda trippy.

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